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Chapter Six 
 
The Chinese Development Model: 
International Development and Hegemony 
 
 
Jonathan H. Ping 
Bond University 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What is the appropriate role for the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC or China) to play in the contemporary 
international political economy (IPE)? This chapter employs 
the discipline of IPE to explain the contemporary state market 
relationship from a historical perspective, and develops the 
thesis that China as a great power should take a more active 
responsibility in order to play a considerably larger role in the 
IPE. We cannot ignore the fact that today’s IPE, because of 
liberal interdependence and the functions of the mercantilist 
security dilemma, links regional issues to global issues; given 
this set of circumstances, China must of necessity engage with 
the IPE. It is equally important to remember that, as a 
consequence of its relative size, Chinese development will 
impact profoundly on the development of all nation-states. 
The option facing all other nation-states, then, is to decide 
whether they will view China as an ally or as a threat to their 
own development. Of course, China does not have to remain 
passive while such decisions are made, but can strategically 
influence the choices other nation-states make. 
 
The pertinent question, therefore, is what larger role should 
China play? Clearly, China, as the leading and most 
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successful developing nation-state, cannot be expected to 
provide political and public goods akin to those of developed 
nation-states—it is therefore correct for China to focus on its 
own development. However, one consequence of the 
structural power1 that links regional issues to global outcomes 
is that the Chinese nation-state will be required by the rest of 
the world to behave as a great power, beyond actions 
commensurate to its present per capita statistical profile. 
Whilst this might be a burden, the Chinese development 
model offers both examples and opportunities that are 
valuable to other nation-states; simultaneously, this model can 
continue to directly benefit Chinese development and 
facilitate China’s path towards greater global power. 
Importantly, the Chinese development success should not be 
taken as a model for global development, but as a practical 
and theoretical catalyst for others to pursue similar outcomes.2 
 
China’s ‘rise’ to global political and economic power is 
neither inevitable nor interminable; indeed, it may already be 
nearing its height. As its domestic market matures (bringing 
with it increased labour prices and higher levels of domestic 
consumption) the resultant increasing requirement for a 
greater share of global resources will require China to 
demonstrate hegemony in the IPE if it is to be accepted as 
more than a global factory.3 What we are seeing is neither a 
reluctant hegemon nor a contained hegemon; rather, it is a 
presently incapable one. If it is to avoid regress, China will be 
required to provide political and public goods to the IPE. Put 
bluntly, it will need to give in order to get. China will be 
incapable of facilitating and obtaining its domestic 
development goals unless it becomes a responsible and benign 
hegemon. 
 
The first part of this chapter considers the context of the 
Chinese development model in order to identify the links 
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between regional and global development. IPE as a field of 
study; the state market relationship; state and market in a 
globalised IPE; the hierarchy of great, middle and small 
powers; and macro change are all discussed in this context. 
The second part of the chapter presents an analysis of 
international development and the opportunity for China to 
provide political and public goods to the IPE in the role of a 
benign hegemon. 
 
Section One: Context 
What is IPE? What use is it? 
 
Within the scholarly discipline of international relations (IR), 
the sub-field of IPE was reawakened, phoenix-like, from the 
earlier Political Economy of Adam Smith (1723–1790), 
Thomas Malthus (1766–1834), David Ricardo (1772–1823) 
and Karl Marx (1818–1883). The industrial revolution that 
bloomed from the midlands of the United Kingdom in the late 
eighteenth century was one of the first subjects of Political 
Economy, when Smith challenged mercantilism with the 
radical concepts of liberalism. Karl Marx began a grander task 
of looking beyond the temporal structures of politics and 
economics to critically theorise the inequality of distribution 
and ownership, while later critical theorists considered gender, 
environmental stability and the construction of meaning. 4 
Political Economy thus began an investigation into how 
development is achieved. 
 
From the 1970s, pioneering scholars such as Susan Strange, 
Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin and Robert Cox noted the 
confluence of domestic and international, political and 
economic issues, which led to a realisation that to study the 
wealth of nations was in effect to recognise—and thus 
harness—the accelerating process of globalisation which was 
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magnifying domestic potential by overcoming sovereign state 
limits and domestic market constraints.5 At the close of the 
twentieth century, with the Cold War finished and the War on 
Terror yet to begin, the ideological contest to determine the 
meaning and purpose of political and economic activity was 
declared over by many Western scholars—and yet the bulk of 
humanity remained in abject poverty.6 
 
Beyond the developed Western world, the industrial 
revolution that began in Europe has continued to extend 
across the planet. The PRC and the Republic of India in the 
early twenty-first century are achieving the same expansionist 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annual percentage growth 
rates of the 1980s ‘Asian Miracle’ Tiger Economies (British 
Crown Colony of Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Republic of 
Singapore and Taiwan) or of 1960s Japan. 7  Study of the 
ongoing industrial revolution can be deceptive if regional or 
individual state components are accentuated. From (and in) 
the Western world, development seemed complete. In Asia, 
the industrial revolution was described as the Asian Miracle—
a thesis of the 1980s and 1990s that was widely debated. 
Scholarly enquiry and dialogue, however, is dialectic, and in 
1994 Paul Krugman correctly identified the Asian Miracle as 
merely part of the ongoing industrial revolution. He argued 
that the high growth rates, between five and twelve per cent, 
simply reflected the input of more factors of production (land, 
labour, capital and enterprise)—new industries, skills and 
knowledge being the result.8 The Asian Currency Crisis of 
1997 aided interpretation of the Asian Miracle as part of the 
industrial revolution; suddenly, the characteristic boom and 
bust pattern became apparent. However, this insight made the 
Crisis no less astonishing or easier to analyse, nor was it any 
easier to incorporate into scholarship and policy, as scholars 
of the period soon found. 
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IPE, as with the Political Economy of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, has always reflected the observations of 
scholars who collected data and proposed theory. Scholarly 
enquiry is only useful beyond the university campus when it 
responds to events and the requirements of society. The 
wealth of nations (or development) is arguably the most 
important subject to be addressed by IPE scholarship. In this 
context, study and interpretation of China’s industrial 
revolution is part of an ongoing study begun by Political 
Economy, and is essential to the understanding of how the 
wealth of nations—or development—is achieved. 
 
Since the late 1970s the Chinese state has pursued socialist 
politics and market economics, creating a developmental state 
and a development model that has been labelled ‘Socialist 
State Directed Market Capitalism’.9 The development success 
is considerable. The tables below, taken from the United 
Nations Development Programme, show that despite 
population increase, per capita wealth has increased fivefold 
and life expectancy has also increased.10 These phenomenal 
development successes are also displayed in the broad 
composite Human Development Index. Numerous other 
statistics, such as the GDP Real Growth percentage increase, 
reflect the inspiring sustained development.11 
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Figure 6.1 GDP Per Capita PPP, (Constant 2006) 1980–2007 
  
 
Figure 6.2 Human Development Index 1980–2007 
 
 
Jonathan H. Ping 
 
Figure 6.3 Life Expectancy at Birth, years 1980–2007 
 
Figure 6.4 Population, millions 1980–2007 
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The great task for IPE in the twenty-first century is to lift a 
greater percentage of humanity out of poverty by focusing on 
outcomes—‘black or white, the cat must catch mice’. The 
state market debate, the study of the role of actors and/or 
systemic governance, must have a purpose and meaning; 
namely, to produce development globally.12 As such, IPE can 
be enriched by addition of the development success of the 
PRC. 
 
State and market 
 
A lodestar of this chapter is the state market relationship and 
the depiction of that relationship by IPE scholars. 
Conventional IPE scholarship insists that states require 
control and markets struggle against it. 13  The relationship 
therefore can be construed as conflictual and competitive. The 
Westphalian state employs statecraft to build sovereignty 
against internal and external threats to its ongoing existence—
including the threat of an unregulated market. The goal is to 
(re)create the state through the practice of statecraft, with the 
ultimate and yet purely theoretical goal being a sovereign 
state, which holds supreme legitimate authority within a 
territory. 14  The market inversely requires freedom from 
restriction, especially from the impost of state regulatory 
intervention. The perfectly competitive market is the 
theoretical goal that, if achieved, would produce the most 
efficient production and exchange. Whilst these statements are 
correct, they do not necessitate conflict; however, IPE 
scholarship was encouraged to focus on the struggle between 
state and market by the normative assumptions of ideologies. 
 
With mercantilism’s focus on the state and liberalism’s focus 
on the market, IPE scholars naturally emphasised the state 
versus market question. This led to broad debates about the 
consequences of globalisation and the appearance of 
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alternative actors. A prominent thesis was that globalisation 
through market liberalisation would be problematic for the 
state. An equally valid thesis argued that the state was to be 
replaced and become extinct. During the second half of the 
twentieth century globalisation has occurred and three new 
actors have joined the state as powerful elements in the IPE: 
intergovernmental organisations (IGO); nongovernmental 
organisations (NGO); and multinational corporations (MNC).  
 
The adversarial state market theses joining globalisation and 
new actors can be summarised as follows: Intergovernmental, 
multilateral and/or regional political organisations, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, United 
Nations or the European Union (EU), would curtail state 
control over the IPE. NGOs, through the information 
revolution, under such circumstances would form global 
advocacy networks to determine civil, human, environmental 
and/or other norms and standards, without deference to the 
sovereign right of the state. The provision of goods and 
services was to be outsourced to more efficient market-based 
MNCs. The outcome would be a global market-based 
civilisation—a victory for liberalism, the market, firm and 
individual. 
 
However, the adversarial state versus market depiction has 
been misleadingly over-emphasised. The creation of the 
European political economy, and the subsequent European 
Miracle, itself displays a history of compromise and symbiotic 
cooperation between the state and the market that clearly 
belies the ‘win/lose’ ‘one or the other’ characterisation. 15 
From the year 1500, European politics and economics 
cooperated, with the state providing political stability and 
security and the market providing efficient production and a 
source for tax revenue. The exceptional compromise between 
the state and market within the European political economy 
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allowed it to outcompete all other forms to become, by the 
twentieth century, the basis of a global political economy. 
 
The symbiotic relationship between state and market was 
essential to the transition from a mercantile to a capitalist 
economy in nineteenth century Europe (and still is today). 
Eric R. Wolf’s discussion of this period could easily be read 
as a paragraph on twentieth century Japan, the Asian Tigers or, 
indeed, contemporary China: 
 
Before capitalist relations could come to dominate 
industrial production, a set of related changes was 
required to guarantee the new order. The state had 
to be transformed from a tributary structure to a 
structure of support for capitalist enterprise. 
Tributary relations, embodied in monopolies of all 
kinds, cut into the reproductive capacity of capital 
and had to be abrogated. The officialdom of the 
state apparatus had to be made responsive to the 
needs of capital accumulation by removing state 
control over productive resources and by reducing 
the hold of tributary overlords over the machinery 
of the state. At the same time, state investment had 
to be directed towards the creation of an 
infrastructure of transportation and communication 
that could benefit capital without demanding 
excessive outlays from it. There was a need for new 
legal codes, protecting rights of private property 
and private accumulation, on the one hand, and 
enforcing new forms of the labor contract, on the 
other. State intervention had to be mobilized also to 
break down intra-state barriers to the movement of 
capital, machines, raw materials, and labor. Finally, 
state assistance and subsidies were often necessary 
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to protect nascent industries against external 
competition, or to open up new markets abroad.16 
 
In Asia, the development success of Japan and the Asian 
Tigers was accomplished with the use of the European 
political economy model—a strong and mercantilist state 
operating within a global market. Both European and Asian 
Miracles succeeded through a sustained organisation of a 
symbiotic state-market relationship and a readiness to reach 
outwards, rather than an exclusive focus on one at the expense 
of the other. If it is to succeed, the Chinese Miracle must do 
the same. 
 
Western IPE scholarship in the twentieth century can be 
excused for its oversights, limited and curtailed as it was by 
the normative elements of the ideologies within which it 
operated. This was entrenched by a real conflict in the IPE 
over the rise and fall of Marxism, that is, the Cold War. To 
focus on identifying the benefits of a strong socialist state 
directing the market in the twentieth century context of the 
Cold War was perilous for the careers of individual scholars. 
In the twenty-first century, however, when interest is directed 
to outcomes rather than an ideological contest, it seems 
foolhardy to ignore the development success of the PRC. In 
the current context, normative assumptions can be exchanged 
for rigorous analysis. The state and the market both allocate 
resources and distribute power. They are both necessary to 
generate development. The Chinese development model 
highlights the flaws in a conventional, ideologically and 
contextually driven characterisation of the state–market 
relationship precisely because it has produced positive 
development outcomes. It demonstrates without doubt that the 
development-adroit market requires a developmental state just 
as it always has done. 
 
Jonathan H. Ping 
 
State and market in a globalised IPE 
 
The freedom from ideological contestation that resulted from 
the end of the Cold War has allowed IPE scholars to focus 
purely on development outcomes.17 A second benefit has been 
the acceleration of globalisation, which has fundamentally 
changed the state–market relationship. Throughout the latter 
part of the twentieth century, the reduction of political barriers 
to trade and the advent of cheaper transport and 
communication enhanced the development of a global market. 
The symbiotic relationship between a state and its own 
domestic market was thus transformed into a symbiotic 
relationship between individual states and a shared global 
market. One of the most significant outcomes of this major 
shift has been structural interdependence.18 
 
As a result of this interdependence, nation-states must 
accommodate the global market in their domestic market 
structure in order to develop. Anthony Payne deploys Coxian 
critical political economy19 to define development as: 
 
the collective building by the constituent social and 
political actors of a country (or at least in the first 
instance a country) of a viable, functioning political 
economy, grounded in at least a measure of 
congruence between its core domestic 
characteristics and attributes and its location within 
a globalizing world order and capable on that basis 
of advancing the well-being of those living within 
its confines.20  
 
States must accommodate the global market in order to 
develop their domestic market. They are unable to create the 
necessary symbiotic state–market relationship to produce 
development unless they engage with the globalised world. 
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Thus the twenty-first century states–market relationship in a 
globalised IPE results in both opportunities and constraints. 
The greatest opportunity is the development that results from 
the sustained organisation of a state-market political economy 
as originally created in Europe. The greatest constraint is the 
requirement to reach outward into the global system and have 
structural interdependence in part determine the type of 
political economy that is possible. As such, the Chinese 
development model must increasingly have congruence with 
the globalising world order. The structural power of the PRC 
must correspondingly be accommodated by the world order. 
 
The symbiotic states–market relationship must be sustained. 
The states must legislate, regulate and create the market. In a 
global market system all states must contribute to the 
maintenance of the global market. This is initially undertaken 
through domestic politics, and by regional politics through 
regional organisations, but increasingly it has, and will 
increasingly continue to be, undertaken through global IGOs 
such as the World Trade Organisation, IMF, World Bank, and 
broader forums such as the Group of Twenty (G20).  
 
However, whilst all states are required to contribute to the 
maintenance of the global market, the reality is that not all 
states have the same resources or abilities to do so, and the 
different levels of development globally mean that not all 
states receive the same benefits from doing so. A general rule 
of development in the twenty-first century is that the more 
developed or larger the state, the more they are expected to 
contribute to the maintenance of the global market. 
Additionally, great powers are expected to contribute extra 
because of these power differentials; correspondingly, great 
powers have a deterministic role. 
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Great, middle and small powers 
 
There are many sources of power within the IPE: military and 
economic capacity; relative size of population or geographic 
area; GDP growth rate or composition of the economy; 
resources available or trade volume; life expectancy at birth or 
level of education. For centuries scholars have employed 
statistically measurable and perceived sources of power to 
rank states in order to determine their potential relative power 
(that is, the ability of A to make B do what A wants, whether 
or not B wants to). What is critical here, however, is the 
difference between potential power and the will and capacity 
to exercise that power.  A hierarchy of states reflects the 
potential ability of states to engage in the IPE and their ability 
to exercise structural power. This hierarchy has three tiers: 
great, middle and small.21 
 
What level of power do these three types of states have to 
influence the IPE in order to maintain the global market? 
Great powers have enough power to impose themselves on the 
IPE and can resist change imposed on them. Middle powers 
do not have enough power to impose or to resist change, but 
they can hybridise. Middle powers hybridise new sources of 
perceived power and statecraft from the IPE that will help 
them survive by state recreation (that is, by developing more 
effective new policies). They blend parts of what is successful 
for other states (normally the largest or most successful—
possibly China in the current situation) with what is unique in 
themselves to create original forms of statecraft and perceived 
power. Small powers have no ability to resist or impose 
change.22 
 
What is the expectation of the PRC with regard to its 
contribution to the maintenance of the global market? China is 
a great power primarily because of its population size, but 
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other measures, such as percentage of global trade, size of 
GDP, military expenditure and many others, are rising. It is 
not yet a fully developed state. However, as a result of its 
successful development model, it is developing very quickly, 
and globally there is an expectation that it will eventually 
equal or surpass the level of development in Europe and the 
United States of America (US) to become a developed great 
power. Thus, China should already be playing a central role in 
maintaining the global market and its level of contribution 
should be increasing. Middle and small powers should 
increasingly look to China for examples of good governance 
for development. How can this be done? 
 
What is macro change and how does it occur? 
 
Macro change refers to those changes that take effect within 
and create structural power generally over long time periods. 
These changes are often imperceptible to those experiencing 
them—the slow shift from agricultural to mercantile to an 
industrialised economy is barely noticeable on the ground—or 
they may be dramatic and life-threatening, as in the case of 
war. Equally important to the extent to which these changes 
are noticed by participants is the difference between change 
being unintentional or purposeful. It is broadly acknowledged 
that the main actors of change are states, IGOs, NGOs and 
MNCs; the relative influence of which is debated, primarily, 
along ideological lines. All agree, however, that the macro 
change is caused by states, other actors (the IGOs, NGOs and 
MNCs), and the environment/context. 
 
Great powers have set the rules for centuries, with hegemons 
having the greatest influence. When it comes to macro change, 
how is this power displayed? In 1939 the US renounced the 
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between itself and the 
Empire of Japan. This was followed in 1940 by a partial 
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embargo on aircraft fuel and scrap metal being imported from 
the US into Japan. On 1 August 1941 the US confronted the 
Japanese Empire by imposing an oil embargo. The Japanese 
responded on 7 December with the infamous attack on Pearl 
Harbour, and the US declared war. The US therefore used, in 
corresponding order, political, economic and then military 
power.23 
 
It did so purposefully in response to an equally purposeful 
attempt by the expansionist Japanese to change the IPE. Both 
of these states were attempting to create alternative IPEs from 
that established by Great Britain in the nineteenth century. 
The Japanese envisioned a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. Simultaneously, by the 1940s the US had begun to 
use its power to establish a liberal global market. It continued 
its purposeful macro change of the IPE in opposition to 
another great power, the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics (Soviet Union), until 1989 when the Soviet Union 
collapsed, leaving the US as the victor of a fifty-year conflict 
to determine the nature of the IPE. All of these situations 
demonstrate how states require political, economic and 
military power if they are to effect macro changes. 
 
A second source of macro change in the IPE is the IGOs, 
NGOs and MNCs. Enabled by—and in cooperation with—
state power, these other actors have increased in number and 
become more powerful, to the extent that they all now have 
the ability to effect macro change both unintentionally and 
purposefully. Robert Keohane, for example, argues that, 
through liberal institutionalism, the realist conflict between 
states can be quelled by IGOs.24 Margaret Keck’s study of 
Transnational Advocacy Networks articulates the power of 
NGOs to use information, accountability, leverage and 
symbolic politics to change the IPE.25 
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IPE textbooks note that in the twenty-first century, MNCs—as 
independent firms operating within and across state borders—
generated global market change through competition based on 
the factors of production. While this is sometimes a deliberate 
strategy, unintentional macro change in the IPE can also occur 
as a result of the competition between MNCs. The 2008–9 
Global Financial Crisis is the most recent example. Such 
macro changes are produced by spreading production 
technology and knowledge, allocating resources, providing 
goods and services, diversifying local production and 
economies, increasing local competition, sponsoring or 
instigating infrastructure development, enhancing education 
opportunities, dispersing information, standards and culture, 
employing labour and paying states tax revenue. 
 
A third source of change in the IPE is the environment or the 
context of the actors in the form of resource scarcity, 
innovation, epistemic bases and unexpected shocks. Resource 
scarcity limits what is possible and, as noted in Chapter Five, 
oil is the most important of the scarce resources. Innovation in 
political or economic structures gives rise to change; as we’ve 
seen, the invention of the Westphalian state or the first 
multinational corporate structure had a dramatic effect on the 
IPE. Epistemic bases generate unexpected elementary 
knowledge and serendipitous changes (see Chapter Two). 
Finally, unexpected shocks, such as the terrorist attacks on 11 
September 2001 or the 2004 or 2011 Tsunamis, change the 
environment or context within which the actors operate. 
 
At present, the global macro changes emanating from China 
are the result of external responses to domestic policies, 
change and development. China’s effect on the IPE is clearly 
unintentional—China is simply focused on its own 
development. Nevertheless, the rising prices of scarce 
resources, the increasing emission of CO2 globally, the 
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weaponisation of the Sudanese Darfur conflict, movements in 
currency values, Australia’s miraculous recession-free 
passage through the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis, 
Australia’s booming resource sector and the effects on its 
manufacturing sector, and many other issues have been 
attributed by governments, the media and academics to the 
‘China factor’.26 
 
China is not contributing to the maintenance of the IPE in a 
purposeful way as a developing great power, primarily 
because it is currently incapable of doing so. It does not have 
the appropriate relationships or capabilities to enforce macro 
changes. Nor does it have a developmental state that is 
purposefully assisting in creating and recreating the global 
market. China has a symbiotic state–market relationship rather 
than a states–global market relationship as required in a 
globalised IPE. This arrangement is not sustainable, as the 
externalities of China’s domestic policies will eventually 
impinge on the interests of other nation-states.27 Furthermore, 
China does not have a role in IGOs commensurate with its 
great power status or of the ‘rising China’ expectation, nor 
does it have NGOs promoting its norms and values. It does, 
however, have MNCs, such as the national oil companies 
(Sinopec Corporation, China National Petroleum Corporation 
and China National Offshore Oil Corporation), but these are 
oil focused and limited by their lack of transparency, and have 
limited tradability of ownership (see Chapter Five). To be able 
to make macro changes to the IPE, China needs to establish 
political, economic and military power and be able to pursue 
its interests through the other actors. It needs to be proactive 
in responding to—and planning for—macro changes from the 
environment/context. Critically, it needs the will and capacity 
to exercise power. 
 
  
Jonathan H. Ping 
 
Section Two: Analysis 
 
International development 
 
International development is the central question and 
opportunity of this century. The myriad of problems 
confronting the IPE can be overcome by expanding 
development of more of the IPE to Western levels (currently 
approximately only 25% is developed to this level). This is an 
indication that IPE as a field of study has failed to respond to 
global demands; rather, it is generating knowledge primarily 
for the Western developed world. In addition, the enormous 
number of critical problems that are not being addressed 
adequately also hints at the failure of scholars to perform a 
functional role for the global community. By studying China 
as a developmental state, we may gain crucial insights that 
lead to a larger percentage of the planet eventually being 
developed; perhaps the problems of the developing world will 
also gain more prominence in Western consciousness. 
International development overall would certainly benefit 
from more active engagement between China and other 
nation-states. 
 
There are many examples where this combined knowledge 
can be enlightening. Global population growth can be slowed 
by government policy, such as China’s ‘One Child’ policy; 
equally, population growth rates in the West have fallen as a 
result of education, the emancipation of women and the desire 
for self-actualisation over reproduction. Arguably, terrorism is 
a choice taken as a result of poverty and a lack of alternative 
paths to self-determination, but is also made possible by the 
fact that all states collude in allowing the existence of failed 
states. 28  Cornucopians believe that environmental and 
population sustainability can be achieved through 
technology—but that technological knowledge is located in 
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the developed world. These, as well as many other issues 
(food production, fair trade, human rights, shelter, clean water 
and sanitation) can all be improved by linking states through 
their committed engagement in producing international 
development. 
 
The definition of development by Payne quoted earlier can be 
given greater detail to give an understanding of what specific 
actions need to be taken to achieve development. The 
definition includes a ‘functioning political economy … 
advancing the well-being of those living within its confines’.29 
Essentially then, development is the provision of goods and 
services that improve standards of living for human beings. 
International development is the same on a global scale. The 
role of states in international development is to provide 
political and public goods globally. 
 
Political goods arise from the social contract between state 
and citizen and are funded through taxation—hence, the 
symbiotic relationship between state and market. Without the 
market, a state cannot fund political and public goods. Of 
these political goods, security is the most fundamental—no 
other political goods can be supplied without security. Others, 
in descending order of importance, are: rule of law and 
contract; medical/health care; education (community, school, 
university); infrastructure (roads, rail, power, water); financial 
system (currency, banking); fiscal and institutional 
environment; ground for civil society; and regulation of the 
common. 
 
Public goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Their 
availability is not reduced by consumption and consumers 
cannot be excluded from them by price or other mechanisms. 
Examples include access to public parks, rule of law, free-to-
air national media services, use of a currency, and access to 
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water and air. This definition is expanded within economics to 
collective goods, that is, public goods that could be provided 
by the private sector. Privatisation and public/private 
partnership are corresponding policies that may allow MNCs 
to provide collective goods. Thus, public goods are provided 
to the society by the state and are freely available. 
 
The concept of global public goods (GPG) has gained 
increasing attention over the past decade, with the concept 
being noted by IGOs in particular. The UN, IMF, World Bank 
and many others have all discussed the concept and added to 
the list of GPGs. These include health, financial security and 
market efficiency, environment, human security and peace, 
information and knowledge, water, air and food. In a similar 
way, credit has been advocated as a human right by Professor 
Mohamed Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh.30 The failure of the GPG concept to be put into 
practice is primarily because of the financial implications, but 
the question of who will actually provide them also remains 
unanswered.31 
 
IGOs and NGOs are not able to provide public goods because 
they do not have the necessary tax revenue from the symbiotic 
states–market relationship to fund those goods. Rather, IGOs 
are funded by states; while NGOs are funded by states, IGOs 
and donations. MNCs, in contrast, are obliged to make a profit. 
Thus, states remain the only viable actor to provide public 
goods. Given this situation, it becomes the responsibility of 
great powers to provide global public goods. Although they 
are not specifically designed to do so, this is in fact the 
consequence of their global reach. The result is simulated or 
pseudo GPGs. Examples are the global positioning system, 
internet, secure sea lanes, nuclear umbrella, and confrontation 
with and containment of rogue states. The US has provided 
these services globally, but always fundamentally for their 
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own national interest. In a purely global context, security and 
the (re)creation of the global market are the public goods 
provided by the US that are of greatest importance. What 
political public goods and pseudo GPGs could China provide 
globally? 
 
The concept of international development, through the 
provision of political public goods and pseudo GPGs, greatly 
affects traditional IR and IPE. When we place basic 
definitions within the international development dialectic, 
their requisites change radically. Suddenly, a threatening 
superpower wielding nuclear weapons is transformed into a 
nation-state providing a wide range of high quality political 
and public goods to the IPE. The US is a case in point: it is a 
superpower as defined by traditional measures, but the lense 
of international development reveals that it has a low Human 
Development Index because of its large poor population. 
 
This conceptual change builds from the work of Robert 
Rotberg, who employs the concept of political goods in order 
to classify states.32 His typology categorises states according 
to the quality and range of political goods they provide, 
labelling them as strong, weak, failed or collapsed. This 
lexicon has in turn been used to consider global security. 
Weak, failed and collapsed states have been identified as 
vehicles for globally destabilising forces such as transnational 
security threats, humanitarian disasters or global terrorism. 
Seen from this perspective, China can be seen as having the 
potential to be an international development superpower. 
However, China can only effect macro change if it is aided by 
other actors as well. 
 
International development offers a huge business opportunity 
for MNCs. Obviously, ‘Chinese’ MNCs can provide a major 
advantage for China’s attempts to effect macro change. There 
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are approximately four billion potential customers waiting for 
goods and services—the other 75% of the world that is not yet 
developed to Western levels. The products themselves already 
exist. Look around the room or space that you are in; any of 
the goods or services you see that are not already in the 
developing world are in demand there. However, to deliver 
them to the bulk of humanity requires a significant revision in 
the terms and methods that are employed in their creation and 
distribution. A good example is the innovative provision of 
credit to the poor through micro-finance that developed 
outside of the Western world, first in South America and then 
in South Asia.33 Similarly, China’s developmental model is 
certainly working effectively and can provide the stimulus for 
further innovation elsewhere. 
 
Unlike the creation of new products, or the technologies that 
make them, the international development business 
opportunity entails known and manageable risks, such as 
transport and language barriers. There is minimal competition 
from established MNCs, as they are generally focused on the 
Western markets. This, however, may not continue; more and 
more, scholars in the West are calling for an increased role for 
MNCs in international development. Professor Lodge of 
Princeton University, for example, has demanded the pooling 
of risk through the establishment of a World Corporation in 
the US, while Craig and Peter Wilson have reached similar 
conclusions in Make Poverty Business.34 
 
However, this idea of profiting from the poor raises the issues 
of dependency theory and the problems of the core exploiting 
the periphery. Western MNCs have been labelled exploitative, 
extracting profits from developing states by taking advantage 
of their cheaper labour. This cannot be entirely refuted—
higher profits have undeniably resulted—but there are also 
development benefits. However, ‘Chinese’ MNCs cannot be 
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accused of such exploitation, as they are, theoretically at least, 
in the periphery. Indeed, ‘Chinese’ MNCs have already been 
identified by the developing world as being more palatable 
actors in these matters, and it is problematic for academics to 
deploy dependency theory against a peripheral developing 
state (see discussion and quotes by African leaders in Chapter 
Five).  
 
Secondary arguments for China to encourage its MNCs to 
focus on the opportunities afforded by international 
development can be built from historical precedent and 
economics. Eric R. Wolf noted that historically states have 
guided their MNCs; as quoted earlier: ‘… state assistance and 
subsidies were often necessary to protect nascent industries 
against external competition, or to open up new markets 
abroad’.35 Contemporary IPE scholarship argues that selling 
higher value-added and luxury goods is more profitable and 
thus an obvious state and corporate goal. Historically, 
however, this can be challenged: the British Empire lost 
control of the luxury spice trade (from the Malay Archipelago 
to Europe) to the Dutch, but eventually became more 
powerful by trading in the alternative mass market in cotton 
(from South Asia to Europe).36 The present hegemon, the US, 
rose to power on a mass consumption consumer domestic 
market. US Fordist mass production provided employment 
and income for labour, and thus consumers and profits for 
businesses. Mass consumption or survival goods and services 
also have a stable demand curve because they are 
accompanied by an inelastic price curve in comparison with 
niche market or luxury goods. 
 
Selling basic development goods and services such as food, 
shelter, water and sanitation to four billion consumers may be 
better for the Chinese state and ‘Chinese’ MNCs than selling 
aircraft or cars to a shrinking Western population.37 Finally, 
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there is a historical precedent that, over long periods of time, 
macro changes made by states that result in the provision of 
more and higher quality political goods and services leads to 
power because they simply out-govern the opposition, 
winning support by supporting the population.38 
 
China, as a great power and a developing state that has 
already provided a large portion of humanity with political 
and public goods, is in a significantly better position to take 
advantage of the international development opportunity than 
an already developed great power. There are significant 
barriers to the US or EU playing a role in macro change in the 
IPE. China is not without competition here, however; the 
other BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) states have the 
potential to participate. India and Brazil are serious 
contenders as alternative peripheral sources of state leadership 
in the IPE. The UN has projected that India’s population will 
outstrip China’s by 2050.39 Furthermore, India is a democracy 
and has English as a national link language, making it 
compatible with the West politically and economically. It 
already manages an extremely diverse polity that can easily be 
described as a micro or continental-size model for 
globalisation. Arguably, the Chinese Socialist State Directed 
Market Capitalism is at present statistically best placed of the 
developed great powers and the BRIC states. 
 
The opportunity to gain power by becoming capable of 
making macro change in the IPE is undermined by three 
ordering principles: democracy, self-determination and human 
rights. There are three main theses about the link between 
democracy and development: firstly, economic development 
leads to democracy; secondly, democracy is essential for 
development; and thirdly, development has nothing to do with 
democracy. All of these theses have been researched 
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extensively, both theoretically and through the collection of 
data, with no clear result.40 
 
The first thesis argues that economic development creates 
surplus wealth and time. A middle class expands and has the 
capacity to become concerned with quality of life. However, 
the resultant wish for self-determination requires political 
activity, and political activity leads to a call for access to 
statecraft. The broadest level of access to statecraft is through 
the application of democratic theory.  
 
The second thesis argues that development is the fulfilment of 
individuals’ lives. Thus development determined by ‘any 
other’ than each individual is not able to provide individual 
fulfilment. As a result of this, democracy is regarded as the 
best form of political organisation because it gives precedence 
to the individual. Lack of individual fulfilment under any 
other system creates political instability and threatens 
development and sustainability. Thus democracy is essential 
for development; without it, nation-states will reach an 
insurmountable political barrier to development. 
 
The third thesis argues that democracy is a purely theoretical 
concept: it does not exist in practice. Access to statecraft is 
only an issue when nation-states are politically fractured or 
economically incompetent. The quality of statecraft is the 
central determinant of development. The link between 
development and democracy is an ideological question for 
each individual, and for the nation-state. However, the 
ideological position of great powers, states in general, IGOs, 
NGOs and MNCs has an impact on development: if they 
believe that democracy is the best system, then they are likely 
to offer assistance to democracies before other states. 
Consequently, the development outcome for democracies is 
more successful than other types of states. 
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A passage past these three theses is provided by a focus on 
international development. Democracy is a political good, but 
only one of many. After all, democracy is expensive, with the 
electoral process costing hundreds of millions. 41  The 
allocation of limited state resources for the creation of a 
democracy may be better spent on alternative political and 
public goods if a high level of development has not already 
been achieved. Is it better to have education, health care or 
democracy? In 2009 the PRC acknowledged the need for 
political reform; however, it clearly stated that this would be 
undertaken on terms set by the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP). Importantly, the CCP also acknowledged the 
congruence required between China and the IPE, with Xinhua 
reporting: ‘Yu Keping, deputy chief of the Central 
Compilation and Translation Bureau, praised democracy as 
“the least defective” among all political institutions created 
and adopted by human beings’.42 
 
From an international development perspective, the PRC, 
since the late 1970s, has been a developmental state and this is 
arguably more important than democratic governance. The 
developmental state has ‘good enough governance’, with the 
essential components being a strong stable state committed to 
the development agenda, and one that in practice pursues 
policies for economic growth and human development. It 
must provide political and public goods in congruence with a 
global states–market IPE. 
 
The issues of self-determination and human rights are far 
more problematic for the PRC and its ability to engage with 
the IPE as a benign hegemon promoting international 
development. In the states–market IPE states are unable to 
repudiate self-determination and abuse human rights over 
long periods of time. Self-determination is a component of 
international development and accommodation of individual 
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identities and development preferences may be achieved 
without the loss of another’s self-determination. However, 
this loss does often occur when development is seen in a 
mercantilist win/lose scenario. The structural power relations 
of the IPE fundamentally require development to be truly 
international development, so the PRC will need to address 
the desires of the Tibetan, Uighur and Taiwanese peoples. 
 
Human rights are often achieved in opposition to state power. 
The win/lose scenario of mercantilism is similar to the 
individual versus the people dichotomy of state policy. As 
development spreads more broadly in China (predominantly 
westward), the PRC needs increasingly to see the people as 
individuals, or at least culturally as families. Thus the three 
ordering principles of the IPE—democracy, self-
determination and human rights—are barriers to China 
gaining power in the IPE, but they are not unacknowledged or 
insurmountable. In the interim, what immediate international 
development opportunities exist for China? 
 
Opportunities in international development to provide 
political and public goods 
 
As a great power and a developing state, China can lead 
change globally. Historically it has played a role in its own 
region. As the most advanced political economy in the 1400s 
it regulated trade in the states of Asia. For example, the Ming 
Dynasty Emperor Chu Ti supported Prince Sri Parameswara 
and his descendants at Malacca. This enabled an independent 
power base, protection against Siam, the subsequent 
dominance of Islam in Southeast Asia, and regional 
development through transhipment trade between India and 
China. 43  Technologically, the Chinese civilisation has 
contributed significant inventions to develop humanity, such 
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as gunpowder, paper making, movable type and the compass. 
It can certainly do these things again. 
 
The current maintenance of the global market is an immediate 
opportunity for China; when seen through a G20 or G2 (the 
US and China) approach, the terrified post-2008–09 Global 
Financial Crisis nation-states can only perceive this as benign 
and benevolent. It is, after all, a developmentally successful 
state of global importance, with a large market, productive 
economy and high savings rate—elements currently lacking in 
the global arena. Nevertheless, Ngaire Woods, Professor of 
IPE and Director of the Global Economic Governance 
Programme at Oxford University, when commenting on the 
2008–09 Global Financial Crisis, highlights the need for great 
power leadership and IGO reform, as well as the lack of 
Chinese commitment to the global character of the IPE: 
 
In respect of the IMF, the G20 have outlined a plan 
for the institution to play a stronger and more robust 
role in monitoring and surveillance, working with 
the newly created Financial Stability Board to 
ensure effective regulation. However, there is no 
plan to give the fund the authority to do this.44 
 
Woods continues: 
 
Conversely, the failure to reform the IMF after the 
East Asian financial crisis of 1997 led these 
countries [China, India and Brazil] to amass foreign 
reserves as ‘self-insurance’ or ‘financial 
independence’ from the IMF. A greater number of 
countries sought recourse anywhere but with the 
IMF in the decade after the East Asian crisis, the 
IMF’s income plummeted, leaving the institution 
with an estimated shortfall of $400 million a year 
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by 2010 and forcing the once-powerful institution 
to lay off 300–400 staff (the total of which was 
2600). Giving countries who turned their backs on 
the institution a reason to return—and thereby 
reversing the amassing of self-insurance reserves—
would require deep reform indeed.45 
 
China has the resources of a great power and thus the 
potential power capacity to pursue reform and recreate the 
global market for the benefit of all nation-states. Although it 
would be doing so primarily for its own benefit, the secondary 
effect of assisting all nation-states can be presented as a 
political and public good with a pseudo GPG effect. The 
structural power of the PRC must correspondingly be 
accommodated in the world order by the other nation-states 
and, as indicated by Woods, the IGOs as well. 
 
A second immediate opportunity for China is the global 
environmental threat of carbon energy. The industrial 
revolution began in the midlands of the United Kingdom in 
part to overcome the lack of firewood.46 Today, ‘peak oil’ and 
industrial pollution are unwelcome global threats—but also 
provide opportunities. Resource scarcity has often led to 
innovation; in the current situation, China, as the largest 
developing state and also as a great power, is uniquely 
positioned to respond. A shift to environmentally sustainable 
capitalism will require a developmental great power to impose 
state regulation if there is any chance of influencing and 
recreating the global market. A technology paradigm shift is 
required from oil and coal to nuclear (fission or fusion) and 
electric energy. Carbon neutral energy is technologically 
possible, but its successful implementation requires 
appropriate political and economic leadership. 
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A global market unguided by a developmental state will 
exhaust the current paradigm, as it is still profitable. It will not 
move to a new paradigm unless regulated by a developmental 
state, as to do so requires the acceptance of great risk. It also 
requires the initial loss of capital in the research and 
development phase of product development and the loss of 
existing profitably invested capital. Only great powers are in a 
position to reconstruct the global market. The already 
developed EU and US are beholden to the MNCs that are 
profitable because of the old technology paradigm. China, as a 
developing great power with the successful development 
model of Socialist State Directed Market Capitalism, can lead 
the world towards a new global political economy that is an 
environmentally sustainable form of capitalism. 
 
There are precedents for Chinese provision of political and 
public goods as pseudo GPGs. At the 2009 China Foreign 
Affairs University East Asia Security Symposium, senior 
Chinese military, government and academic individuals 
proudly, clearly and with Chinese intensity argued this point. 
They listed that China is the largest contributor to the UN of 
the five permanent members of the Security Council; that the 
navy was conducting anti-piracy (sea lane security) operations 
in the Gulf of Aden and the seas off Somalia; that China was a 
financial contributor to Afghanistan and was helping stabilise 
Central Asia through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 
My own point, widely accepted, was that these are a limited 
use of the potential capability of the PRC. A finding of the 
discussion at that symposium is that hegemony, by definition, 
is a problem.  
 
Hegemony and international development 
 
A significant barrier to a greater role for China is the Chinese 
and uniquely socialist PRC, CCP understanding of hegemony. 
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Hegemony is viewed in China through the European, 
historically inspired prism of the Gwai Lo, ‘Ghost Devil’ 
(more commonly translated in the West as ‘Foreign Devil’). 
For example, a core document of the PRC, China’s 
Philosophy on Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century: China in 
Peaceful Development states: ‘Hegemony and power politics 
remain the major chief threat to world peace and 
development’.47 Just as normative assumptions affected IPE 
scholarship and the depiction of the state–market relationship 
in the late twentieth century in the West, currently in the 
twenty-first century the historical experience and the 
socialist/communist/Maoist context of Chinese scholarship is 
affecting the depiction of hegemony, thus limiting Chinese 
engagement and consequently international development. This 
must be overcome as the IPE requires the power of China to 
be converted, through will and capacity, to political and 
public goods, and pseudo GPG, in order for all of us to be 
developed. 
 
Engagement between Chinese and Western (and global) 
knowledge could overcome the negative interpretation and 
miscommunication of hegemony. A common and twenty-first 
century engagement can be aided by the pursuit of 
international development. When applied to the international 
development dialectic, as with the effect on the definition of 
superpower discussed earlier, it has the same effect on 
hegemony; with the definition and concept receding from the 
work of Kindleberger and moving towards Keohane (as 
discussed in Chapter Two) and, in particular, becoming akin 
to the consent aspects of the revisionist Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci. 48  A hegemon in international development is a 
nation-state that provides political and public goods, and 
pseudo GPG, and where consent and belief by lesser nation-
states, IGOs, NGOs and MNCs is critically given judged on 
that basis and because they believe that their interests are the 
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same as—or at least in part satisfied by—the preferences of 
the hegemon. 
 
This is a departure from what Western scholars generally 
argue, and also works in opposition to Kindleberger’s ‘seeded’ 
hegemonic stability theory, because it must also be recognised 
that, in the twenty-first century, a states–market relationship is 
necessary for development. Furthermore, macro change is 
effected not only by nation-states, but also by the other actors 
and the environment/context. This insight reshapes hegemonic 
stability theory in several ways. In the IPE a hegemon is not 
required to establish rules and norms; rather, it is required to 
provide political and public goods as pseudo GPG. Hegemony 
is not the preponderance of material resources, but the 
facilitator of their use through the global market. Hegemonic 
powers do not need control over raw materials, capital or 
markets. They have a competitive advantage in their 
production of highly valued goods and services, as they hold 
the goal of international development. A hegemon is not 
required for this cooperation to take place, but can greatly 
enhance it. Regimes can persist without a hegemon, but will 
be improved through their purposeful macro change.49 
 
The Chinese development model and global perceptions 
 
Why does the Chinese development model need to include 
international development and the provision of political and 
public goods as pseudo GPG? As discussed in Chapter Two, 
the PRC has created concepts that are all complementary to 
the thesis of this chapter, namely, a Harmonious World, a 
New Security Concept, and Harmonious World Orientated 
Diplomacy. The PRC has published numerous documents to 
support these philosophically, such as already noted China’s 
Philosophy on Foreign Affairs in the 21st Century: China in 
Peaceful Development. 50  These goals cannot be achieved 
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without international development because, as China develops, 
its demand for resources will bring it into conflict with all 
other nation-states that are also aiming to develop (see 
Chapter Five on oil). The slow macro change, and even the 
PRC’s obtaining of the sources of macro change, is often seen 
as an additional threat.  
 
Military capability and security is a good example of this kind 
of threat. When, for the first time in history, the Chinese Navy 
joined a UN Security Council anti-piracy mission, many 
welcomed the responsible decision, but others, such as Denny 
Roy, Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Hawaii, reflected 
the fear of ‘rising’ China:  
 
The Chinese deployment gets at a question the US 
and other governments have been asking: ‘Why the 
big Chinese military build-up when no country 
threatens China?’ Or more bluntly, ‘Why do the 
Chinese need a blue-water navy when the US Navy 
already polices the world’s oceans?’51 
 
Sinologist politicians also have problems understanding 
Chinese intentions. In 2007 for the first time Australia elected 
a Prime Minister fluent in Mandarin Chinese. Ex-Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd is an experienced diplomat. He worked 
for the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
between 1981 and 1988 and was posted as First Secretary to 
the Beijing Embassy.52 A new expectation and sense of relief 
was felt in Beijing on his electoral success, as the PRC had 
found a Western friend sympathetic and understanding of 
Chinese history, thinking and developmental challenges. 
However, in 2008 the Rudd Government announced the 
commissioning of a Defence White Paper that was released in 
2009. It announced, in the midst of the world’s worst financial 
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crisis since the Great Depression, the largest naval expansion 
since the Second World War. The paper noted: 
 
4.26 China will also be the strongest Asian military 
power, by a considerable margin. Its military 
modernisation will be increasingly characterised by 
the development of power projection capabilities. A 
major power of China’s stature can be expected to 
develop a globally significant military capability 
befitting its size. But the pace, scope and structure 
of China’s military modernisation have the 
potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if 
not carefully explained, and if China does not reach 
out to others to build confidence regarding its 
military plans. 
 
4.27 China has begun to do this in recent years, but 
needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be 
a question in the minds of regional states about the 
long-term strategic purpose of its force 
development plans, particularly as the 
modernisation appears potentially to be beyond the 
scope of what would be required for a conflict over 
Taiwan.53 
 
The White Paper was widely reported as listing China as 
Australia’s number one threat and as a threat to US 
dominance in the Pacific. 54  By employing international 
development as a goal of the PRC, its power potential can be 
explained and perceived as beneficial. China having power 
projection capabilities to police sea lanes or respond to natural 
disasters, as GPG, is better than China having these to invade 
Taiwan.  
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There are many positive and extraordinary elements of the 
Chinese development model that can be promoted globally as 
political and public goods and as pseudo GPG. They include: 
security, size, production of development, representation of 
the developing world, recognition that population growth rate 
is a barrier to development, the building of environmentally 
sustainable cities, stable ‘good enough governance’, and an 
alternative non-Eurocentric perspective (as noted in other 
chapters). However, unless the PRC becomes capable and 
willing to employ its power through political and public goods 
and as pseudo GPGs, as selected and guided by national 
interest, then it may increasingly find global perceptions 
turning against Chinese development. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By studying the Chinese development model, international 
development and hegemony in the contemporary IPE, this 
chapter has continued the study of how the wealth of nations 
is created that was begun by Political Economy over two 
centuries ago. IPE, through the study of Chinese Socialist 
State Directed Market Capitalism, can contribute significantly 
to addressing the most important challenge of this century—
development. This chapter identified normative ideological 
barriers in contemporary IPE study that over-emphasised the 
conflict potential within the state–market relationship, and 
thus underestimated that relationship’s importance to 
development. It also identified the historical and ideological 
understanding, and resulting definition of hegemony, within 
Chinese scholarship as a barrier to greater engagement in the 
IPE by China. These findings have been fundamental to the 
thesis of the chapter and also offer a path for future and 
broader research. 
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This chapter has established that China must engage globally 
in order to develop. Greater engagement with the IPE is 
mandatory in the contemporary environment for all nation-
states. This is the case because, as a result of globalisation, the 
state–market relationship has been fundamentally altered to 
become a states–market relationship. A states–market 
relationship is now the primary source of development. As a 
consequence of China’s relative size, it is a great power. This 
places expectations on China to employ its power to assist in 
the maintenance of the IPE. This is undertaken through macro 
change, which occurs through the four powerful actors in the 
IPE states, IGOs, NGOs and MNCs. In order to be able to 
affect the IPE, China will need to develop the capability to 
make macro change through all four actors. 
 
China’s increased role in the IPE should be in international 
development. It is uniquely positioned to take advantage of 
the greatest question and opportunity of this century because 
of its unique characteristic of being both a great power and 
also a developing state. It has a successful development 
model—Socialist State Directed Market Capitalism—that it 
can offer to the IPE as an example of development that 
challenges the dominant Western universal neoliberal model 
of development. The developed great powers do not have the 
same capacity because they are already developed, and use of 
Western MNCs is contentious because of the core–periphery 
exploitation prospect (as argued within dependency theory). 
 
China is thus exclusively able to provide political and public 
goods as pseudo GPG to the IPE in order to affect macro 
change for international development. However, three core 
norms or values within the IPE—democracy, self-
determination and human rights—presently hinder China from 
taking full advantage of its unique position. These barriers, 
and the need for reform, have been acknowledged by the CCP. 
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In the immediate future China has two opportunities—global 
market maintenance and environmentally sustainable 
capitalism. By providing pseudo GPG to the IPE, China 
would enable its own development. International development 
would also occur because of China’s capacity to convert its 
power potential, through will, into use. It would become a 
benign and benevolent hegemon, as redefined through the 
perspective of international development. 
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